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ABSTRACT 
This paper provides a model of both R&D and production in procurement processes where 
firms invest in R&D and compete for a government procurement contract. The optimal incentive 
procurement contract is characterized to maximize the government's expected welfare. Explicit 
consideration of the R&D process changes the standard results in several ways. If the traditional 
Baron-Myerson (1982) type contract is used where there is costly R&D, the government buys too 
little from the contractor and pays too little. Raising the price paid encourages private R&D and 
raises the government's welfare. The form of the optimal procurement contract depends on the 
number of firms. With R&D and optimal procurement the government prefers more than one firm to 
invest in R&D and to bid for the production contract. But too much competition may discourage 
private R&D investment and leave the government worse off. Other features of optimal 
procurement and R&D expenditures are also discussed. 
INCENTIVE PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS WITH COSTLY R&D 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Guofu Tan* 
California Institute of Technology 
Pasadena, CA 9 1 125 
It is commonly believed that there is a serious cost overrun problem with defense
procurements in the United States when a sole supplier is chosen. It is also commonly believed that 
the introduction of competition among suppliers could generate substantial price reductions. For 
most defense procurements, a costly research and development (R&D) effort is required of the 
competitors before production of the product After a competition, winning contractors may include 
their R&D costs in the price of the product, but losing contractors must absorb their R&D costs. 
Thus, requiring competition to reduce costs may actually discourage R&D and lead instead to higher 
costs. How do we deal with this problem? This paper is concerned with the design of the optimal 
incentive procurement contract when R&D is an important prior condition to production. 
Recent advances in the economic theory of optimal procurement mainly deal with only two 
issues. The first concerns the selection of the contractors to produce the item being procured at the 
lowest cost. The item could be manufacturing facilities, new weapons systems or electricity 
generation plants. The second concerns attempts to induce the chosen contractor to produce the item 
at the lowest cost. Asymmetry of information between the buyer (the government) and the potential 
firms is often emphasized. It is usually assumed that potential firms have some private information
about production costs at the time they are chosen and that many of decisions made at the production 
stage by the chosen contractor are too costly for the buyer to observe or audit. These decisions affect 
the final cost of production and hence influence both the buyer's and the contractor's welfare. 
Potential contractors are allowed to bid for an incentive contract or bid from a menu of incentive 
contracts. Since the nature of the item is known by both the buyer and the contractors in advance, 
incentive procurement contracts are usually designed either to minimize the buyer's total cost for a 
fixed level of output or to maximize the buyer's surplus when the purchase quantity is variable. In 
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both cases the contracts also give the firms incentives to reveal their private information and/or make 
desirable decisions at the production stage. The earlier literature on this topic can be found in 
Demsetz (1968) and Loeb and Magat (1979). It was extended later on by Baron and Myerson 
(1982), Laffont and Tirole (1986), McAfee and McMillan (1986, 1987), and others. In particular, 
Riordan and Sappington (1987) and Dasgupta and Spulber (1987) have argued that because of 
competition, more efficient outcomes are possible than if there is only a single supplier. Research 
and development issues have not been analyzed in this literature on procurement. Besen and 
Terasawa (1987) have recently provided a selective survey of the literature.1 
At the beginning of many procurements, neither the buyer nor the potential contractors have 
much information about either the technology or the item itself. Therefore, the buyer must find this 
information by himself or ask the contractors. For example, United States defense acquisitions are 
usually characterized by a three-stage process: concept design, development, and production. Most 
of the time, what the government is buying is not only the item itself, but also information about the 
item and the technology. Procurements generate information for the government about improving 
the technical performance and lowering the manufacturing cost. There is usually a tradeoff between 
encouraging production efficiency and encouraging R&D. These features of procurements make it 
very difficult to apply the current theory, which only considers the production stage, to many actual 
cases of defense procurements. We need to link the different stages of the procurement process and 
to investigate R&D behavior in procurements. 
There exists a large literature on R&D races for a patent with a fixed rent in private markets. 
Among others are Loury (1979), Lee and Wilde (1980), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980),2 and recently 
Sah and Stiglitz (1987). Using stochastic racing models and dynamic game theoretic models, they 
emphasize the effects of market structure on private marginal returns to firms from innovations, and 
investigate the relationship between marginal private returns and social returns from innovations. In 
particular, Sah and Stiglitz (1987) have provided a set of conditions under which the total 
expenditure and the pace of innovation in an industry are invariant to the number of firms. These 
approaches cannot be applied to procurement cases directly because, in procurements, the 
government is able to manage and control the supplier's R&D behavior indirectly through the choice 
of the prize for innovation. 3 Traditional R&D models treat the prize as exogenous, but the 
government can offer a production contract as the prize for which the firms compete. The marginal 
private returns and social returns from R&D depend on the quantity to be procured which is specified 
in the production contract. The results of R&D races in private markets may be changed in the 
procurement case. 
We will link the R&D stage and the procurement stage and concentrate on the use ofR&D 
to reduce production costs. The outcome of such R&D is information about the production 
technology. This information is stochastically related to the R&D effort. We first consider a 
principal-agent model of the procurement process in Part II. The production stage is characterized 
by a linear-cost technology with an unknown marginal cost. The R&D outcome is the potential 
marginal cost which the firm can affect by exerting some effort. The procurement process is 
modeled as follows: first, tl1e gove111n1ent an11ow1ces a n:1e11u of productior1 cor1tracts arid con1n1ils 
itself to offer the same contracts at the latter stage. Second, after observing the general contracts, the 
firm invests in R&D. Third, the firm observes the marginal cost outcome and selects a contract it 
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prefers from the contract menu. Finally, the firm produces and gets paid according to the contract it 
has accepted. We have assumed that the govenunent makes a full commitment before R&D. If the 
govenunent can not make a credible conunitment, both the firm and the govenunent might have 
incentives to renegotiate after the R&D is done and change to different contracts. We do not 
consider the renegotiation issue in detail in this paper. 4 
As a benchmark, the first-best solution is briefly discussed in Section II.2. In section II.3, we 
discuss the nonobservability of the R&D investments and the R&D outcome by the govenunent and 
characterize the incentive compatible procurement contracts. We show that under any incentive 
compatible contract, the larger the quantity procured, the more effort the firm exerts in its R&D 
activity. Thus, increasing the procured amount is one way to encourage R&D activities. Section II.4 
characterizes the optimal incentive procurement contract which maximizes the govenunent' s 
expected welfare. Moral hazard exists in this situation due to nonobservability ofR&D investment 
by the govenunent. R&D has an effect on the optimal production level opposite to the adverse 
selection effect. With costly R&D, the govenunent offers a higher and steeper payment schedule, 
compared to the traditional Baron-Myerson (1982) contract where R&D is costless. Also, the 
optimal contract generates positive expected profits for the firm. It is such positive expected profits 
that encourage the firm to do R&D. 
Part III extends the analysis to the case where there are many identical firms competing for 
procurement contracts. The potential R&D outcomes by different firms are assumed to be 
independent. We first discuss Nash equilibrium behavior with respect to R&D expenditures given an 
arbitrary incentive production contract. When the R&D technology exhibits constant marginal 
returns to expenditures, we find an invariance result similar to Sah and Stiglitz (1987). But when the 
R&D technology exhibits diminishing marginal returns to expenditures, we find that Sah and 
Stiglitz's invariance result does not hold and that more competition could reduce the potential 
marginal production cost to its lower bound. The specific nature of the R&D technology plays an 
important role in determining the relationship between R&D and the structure of the industry. 
We then characterize the optimal incentive production contract and the optimal level of 
R&D investments for the competition case in Section III.3. When the R&D technology exhibits 
constant marginal returns to expenditures, we show that the optimum procurement quantity schedule 
is dependent on the number of competing firms. This contrasts with Dasgupta and Spulber (1987) 
and Riordan and Sappington (1987) who find that the optimal quantity schedule does not depend on 
the number of the firms. No R&D behavior was considered in their models. We also find that total 
expenditure on R&D and the pace of innovation depend on the number of firms because of the 
buyer's control of the prize for innovation. Thus, Sah and Stiglitz's invariance result does not hold 
when the prize is endogenous. In other word, the number of firms really matters to the optimal 
procurement. We also find that the govenunent prefers more than one firm to participate in private 
R&D activity and to bid for the production contract. 
In summary, we have provided a model of both R&D and production in procurement 
processes where one or more firms invest in private R&D and compete for a govenunent 
procurement contract. Tne optimal incentive procurement contract has been characterized to 
maximize the govenunent's expected welfare. We have found the following interesting results: 1) 
If the traditional Baron-Myerson (1982) contract is used where there is costly R&D, the govenunent 
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buys too little from the contractor and pays too little. Raising the price paid encourages private 
R&D investment and raises the government's expected welfare. 2) The contractor earns positive 
expected profits under the optimal incentive contract. It is such positive profits that encourage the 
firm to invest in private R&D. 3) Unlike the invariance results found by Riordan and Sappington 
(1987) and Sah and Stiglitz (1987), the optimal incentive production contract, the total equilibrium 
expenditure on R&D, and the pace of innovation in our model depend on the number of competing 
firms in the industry. 4) The government prefers more than one firm to invest in private R&D and to 
bid for the production contract. But too much competition may discourage private R&D investment 
and lead to a reduction in government welfare. 
Before proceeding to our formal analysis, we would like to discuss several recent papers 
which have tried to link R&D and production in procurements. Rob (1986) has included the R&D 
process in his model of procurement contracts by viewing R&D activity as searching behavior. The 
optimal stopping rule allows him to derive the average actual production cost which depends on the 
unit searching cost and the cutoff level. The government prespecifies a quantity and price for the 
project to minimize its outlay on the project. The chosen contractor agrees to disclose the 
technological information that results from its R&D effort, which is the key assumption in his 
model. As a result, it is optimal for the government to award only a fraction of the project to a single 
supplier while the remainder is competitively purchased. This is so called "educational" or 
"learning" buy. We will see in Section III.I that Rob's model of R&D behavior as a search process 
can be viewed as a special case of our model. The R&D technology in his paper exhibits constant 
marginal returns to expenditures. 
Besen and Terasawa (1988) have also developed a simple and different model of research 
and development and production which captures some features of defense acquisitions. In their 
model, the level of technical performance and the amount of hardware to be procured are fixed. In 
addition, the target cost in the production contract will be the maximum level acceptable to the 
government. The contracts in both stages are linear functions of target cost and actual cost, and are 
exogenously given. They find that production will not be carried out efficiently, that cost overruns 
will be commonplace, and that contractors can be expected to incur losses during research and 
development. Our paper differs from theirs in that we will design the optimal incentive procurement 
contract instead of assuming a linear contract exogenously. 
Dasgupta (1987) also considers a two-period procurement model with one buyer and n 
identical firms. Given a second-period sealed-bid auction, each firm chooses an investment level and 
the buyer chooses the reserve price simultaneously. At the Nash equilibrium, there is 
underinvestment relative to the social optimum (cooperative solution) because of "opportunistic" 
behavior. But for most defense procurements, the government and suppliers need not move 
simultaneously. In our model, we consider a Stackelberg game in which the government is the 
leader. In this case the government has indirect control of the supplier's R&D decisions through the 
optimal choice of production contracts. 
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II. A PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL 
II.1. The Model 
We model (defense) procurement as a two-stage process. In the first stage, research and 
development (R&D) is conducted by a firm, but no goods are procured or acquired. The outcome of 
this stage is better knowledge about the cost of producing the item. In the second stage, the item is 
produced by the firm. The output of the item can be obsetved by both the firm and government. We 
assume that there is no uncertainty in the production stage.5 We will refer to the government as the 
principal and the firm as the agent in this Part of the paper. 
We first consider a single agent. The agent produces a good at a constant marginal cost 
which is unknown to both the agent and the principal in the first stage. But the agent can take an 
action x in the R&D process and find out what the marginal cost is, where x can be either money 
spent or a level of effort such as assigning the best engineers in the firm to this R&D project. Let 
x e [0, x], where x > O is the budget. The R&D outcome (marginal cost) is uncertain, so we 
represent it by a random variable Y. We assume that Y is generated according to the following 
production function: 
where n is a random variable with known support, Pr(Q,;; ro) = G (ro), f 1,;; 0, f 12 * 0, f 11 <: 0. The 
realized R&D output is y = f (x, ro). The more effort the agent spends, the lower the marginal cost it 
may find. 
Individual actions directed towards innovation cannot be obsetved by the principal and 
hence cannot be contracted upon. The agent may not have an incentive to invest much in the R&D 
stage. Thus, there may exist a moral hazard problem due to the incongruity of the incentives of the 
agent and the principal. 
Both the principal and the agent are assumed to be risk-neutral. Thus the problem of risk­
sharing is not an issue in this paper. The utility for the principal from procuring an amount Q and 
paying P will be W = B (Q) - P ,  where P and Q are nonnegative real variables and B (Q) is the 
benefit function, B'(Q) > 0, B"(Q) < 0. The utility U for the agent is a function of the income R (or 
the profit R = P -yQ) and the level of effort x, which is assumed to be additively separable. That is, 
U = R - ex, where ex is the R&D cost,6 c <: 0 is a known constant. Everything except ro and x is 
common knowledge. 
The timing of the game is the following. First, the principal announces a menu of general 
contracts and commits itself to offer the same contract at the latter stage. Secondly, after obsetving 
the general contracts, the agent invests in R&D. Third, the agent obsetves the R&D outcomes and 
selects a contract it prefers from the contract menu (announces its type). Finally, the agent produces 
and gets paid according to the contract it has accepted (see Figure 1). 
(Figure 1 here) 
Since ii is too costly for the principal to obsetve or audit the R&D output, the agent may not 
want to submit true information about the R&D output. This asymmetry of information results in 
another incentive problem. By the revelation principle (see the Appendix), we can concentrate on 
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the mechanisms for which the principal asks the agent to report its R&D result and which lead the 
agent to report its private information truthfully. Based on this marginal cost information, the 
principal will offer the agent a procurement contract which specifies an amount Q (y) to be procured 
and a total payment P (y) to the agent. 
To proceed formally, we introduce the following notation. Since Y is a random variable, let 
H(y lx)=Pr(Y ,;;y)=l dG(w) 7(x, ro) Sy 
be the cumulative distribution of Y and and h (y Ix)= H, (y Ix) be the associated density with the 
support 1::1'.· YJ, 0 ,;;,1' ,;;y. We assume the support does not move with x. We also assume that for 
every x E (0, X), H, (y Ix) > O for ally E Q:, Y), so that a change in x has a nontrivial effect on the 
distribution of y. Specially, it will shift the distribution of y to the left in the sense of first-order 
stochastic dominance (see Figure 2). The more effort the agent spends, the higher the probability 
that the agent will find a marginal cost less than y. It is also assumed that Hxx < 0 for all x E (0, x) 
and y E Q'., "j), and that H (j Ix)= 1 for any x, so y represents the current common knowledge of the 
marginal cost. That is, both the agent and principal know that the good can be produced at the 
marginal cost y. We also assume that H (y I 0) = 0 for all y < y. If the agent does not spend any effort 
on R&D, the current marginal cost y won't be reduced. The principal can always procure Q <: 0 at 
the marginal costy such thatB'(Q) = y. The principal gets the total surplus S =B (Q)-y Q while 
the agent earns zero, It is easy to see that S <: 0 since B (Q) is concave function. We can assume 
Q > O for simplicity, 
(Figure 2 here) 
An example of a distribution that satisfies the assumptions is H (y Ix) = l - (1 -y y, 
y E [0, l], x E [O, x]. Let x be the integer number of times the agent draws its cost from a uniform 
distribution on [0, l], then H (y Ix) represents the distribution of the lowest-order statistic. That is, 
the agent chooses the lowest cost from the x drawings. In lhis case, the R&D process is like 
searching behavior and thus the optimal investment level x is the optimal stopping level of the 
drawing. This is similar to 1he optimal stopping approach of Rob (1986). Ano1her example of a 
distribution that satisfies our assumptions is H (y Ix) = l - e-a(x)y, y E [O, � ), and x ;,, 0, where a(x) is 
a positive, increasing, and concave function. Here, the R&D outcome is subject to an exponential 
distribution and the R&D technology exhibits decreasing marginal returns to expenditures. Since 
E (Y Ix)= l / a(x ), the more effort the agent exerts, the lower the expected marginal cost the agent 
observes. This is the distribution of innovation that appears in the literature on stochastic R&D races 
(see Loury 1979, Reinganum 1988, and others). The difference is that in their models y represents 
1he uncertain date at which the R&D project will be successfully completed. 
11.2. The First-Best Solution 
Before analyzing incentive procurement contracts, we look at the first-best solution. 
Suppose that the effort x is observable to both the principal and the agent, and the R&D outcome y 
can also be observed by both parties at the end of the R&D stage. A Pareto-optimum [ Q*(y), x*J 
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can be computed by maximizing the principal's expected welfare given that the agent's expected 
profit is no less than a certain level 7t. We assume 7t = 0 without loss of generality. The first order 
conditions give the following equations: 
B'(Q*(y))=y (1) 
r Q*(y)H,(y lx*)dy - c = 0 
(2) 
Since the R&D output is observable, the principal can procure efficiently. That is, the procurement 
amount Q * is chosen such that the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost. For this optimal 
quantity Q*(y), the marginal social benefit of investment x, which is r Q*(y)H,(y lx*)dy, equals the 
marginal cost of the investment x. Therefore, we have both production efficiency and investment 
efficiency when investment and R&D outcomes are observable to both parties. The optimal 
payment transfer P*(y) to the agent is detennined sgch that the agent earns exactly zero profit. The 
principal gets the total surplus S + S*, where S* = r Q*(y)H(y lx*)dy - ex* is the surplus from the 
R&D under the efficient arrangement of production. We assume that S* is positive, that is to say, 
the R&D is meaningful. 
II.3. Unobservable R&D Investment and R&D Outcomes 
It is a common phenomenon that R&D outcomes cannot be observed or verified by the 
principal directly. It is also costly for the principal to audit the agent to get this information. Thus, 
each agent has private infonnation about the R&D outcome and reports this infonnation strategically 
(e.g. the agent may not tell the truth). This results in an adverse selection problem. Also, the 
principal can not observe the agent's investment level. This results in a moral hazard problem. 
If the principal only cares about efficiency, then he can delegate the production decision and 
R&D decision to the agent and allow the agent to keep the entire social surplus. Loeb and Magat 
(1979) have discussed this situation in detail without R&D. The result is also true in the case of 
costly R&D. The agent will choose quantity and investment level for R&D to maximize the sum of 
its expected profits and the principal's expected welfare. Since both the agent and the principal are 
risk neutral, this full delegation results in the first-best solution. The principal does not get any 
benefit. This solution is not employed in practice for obvious political reasons. 
If the principal's objective is to maximize its own expected welfare, the full delegation of 
decisions is not optimal. The principal should behave monoposonistically. An incentive 
procurement contract is needed to maximize the principal's expected welfare such that the agent 
wants to reveal its private infonnation and to invest in R&D. By the revelation principle,7 we need 
only to consider incentive compatible direct revelation mechanisms. Given a revelation contract 
[Q (y ), P (y )], the agent chooses effort x and gets a realized R&D output y = f (x, ro). Then the agent 
reports y' wl1iCh depends on y: we can denote y' = ¢i(y ). The expected utility for the agent if it 
chooses <J>(y) and x is 
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EU(<j>,y ;x)=f [P(<j>(y))-yQ(<j>(}'))J h(y lx)dy -cx, 
where R (y, y ') = P (y ') -yQ (y') is the profit for the agent from reporting y '  given that y is the true 
R&D output. The agent will choose its R&D strategy x and its reporting strategy <j>(y) to maximize 
its expected utility. 
We can consider the agent's optimal choice of the reporting strategy <j>(y) first. Given any x, 
the agent will choose <I> to maximize the above expected utility subject to <j>(y) E Q>_, fl for any 
y E Q'., fl. We are interested in incentive compatible contracts [Q (y ), P (y )] which give the agent an 
incentive to report the true R&D outcome. That is, we want <j>(y )  = y for ally to be the agent's 
optimal strategy under this contract [Q (y ), P (y )]. Solving this simple optimal control problem, we 
obtain the following 
Lemma 1: A contract [Q (y), P (y)J is incentive compatible if and only if Q'(y ),;; 0 and 
R'(y ) = - Q (y) for ally E Q'.,YJ, whereR (y)= P(y)-yQ (y). 
The proof is standard and is given in the Appendix. Lemma 1 offers a necessary and 
sufficient condition for a production contract [Q (y ), P (y )] to be incentive compatible. We can see 
that incentive compatibility requires the monotonicity of Q (y) and P (y ). The lower marginal cost 
the agent finds, the bigger the procurement amount it will produce, and the higher the payment it 
gets. We also have a decreasing, convex compensation rule R (y ). Reducing the marginal cost 
results in a greater profit share at an increasing rate. This gives the agent an incentive both to reduce 
the marginal cost and to report the _true R&D outcome. From Lemma 1, we can also calculate the 
compensation rule R (y) = R (Y) + r Q (ji )dy for any y .  If Q (y ) ;;, Q (y ) for ally and R (Y) ;;, fi (Y), then 
R (y ) ;;,fi (y) for any y <y. Thus, under an incentive contract, a higher procurement amount 
generally gives the agent a higher profit share. 
We now consider the agent's optimal R&D strategy. Let EU (x) be the agent's expected 
utility under the truthful reporting of the R&D output given the effort level x. That is, 
EU(x) = r R (y)h(y lx)dy - ex. 
Integrating the right hand side by parts and using Lemma 1, we get 
EU(x)=R(Y)+ r Q(y)H(y lx)dy -cx. 
At the beginning of the R&D stage, the agent chooses an investment level x E [0, x] to maximize ex 
ante profit EU (x ). That is, the optimal investment strategy x satisfies 
-
x E argmax R(Y)+ r Q(y)H(y lx)dy -d. 
i E (0,.X] 
(3) 
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Assume that Inada's 'derivative conditions' are satisfied; that is, liin H,(y Ix)=+� and 
x->0 
Jim H,(y Ix)= O for all y E (y, f). Then for any c > 0 and Q (y) such that Q (y) ;:o, 0 for ally and 
x__,,x -
Q (y) > O for a nonzero measure subset of[)', YJ, the solutions for (3) are interior solutions. The Inada 
conditions mean that there is a great potential to increase the probability of finding the marginal 
production cost less than y in the initial investment, and the increasing rate of that probability 
diminishes when the investment level reaches a certain upper bound x. Thus, a certain level of 
investment between zero and the upper bound x is optimal for the agent. 
For these interior solutions of (3), the first order condition gives 
-
r Q(y)H,(y lx)dy-c =0, (4) 
x E (0, X). Since we assume that H= < O for y E Qi_, f), EU (x) is strictly concave in x if Q (y) ;:o, 0 and 
Q (y) ¢ 0 on a nonzero measure subset of[)', y]. The second order condition for (3) is satisfied and 
the interior solution of (4) is unique. Therefore, we can use the first order approach and substitute 
(4) for (3). In the extreme case where c = 0, the solution for (3) is the boundary x. Remember x is 
known by the principal. 
Before considering the optimal procurement contract, we discuss the effect of the quantity 
Q(y) on the R&D strategy. Given Q(y) ;o,O and Q(y) ¢0,letx*( Q) be the solution for (4) and 
EU= EU(x*( Q)) be the agent's expected utility under [Q (y), x*( Q)]. Then we can show the 
following 
Lemma 2: Given any two incentive compatible contracts [Q (y),P(y)] and [Q (y), fS (y)], suppose 
Q (y):;, Q (y) ;:o, O for all y E [)' ,Y]. Then i) x*( Q) ;o,x*(Q ), and ii) if R (j") =ii CS) then EU :;, g{j. 
The proof is by contradiction and is given in the Appendix. Lemma 2 implies that a bigger 
procurement project, in the sense of higher Q at every y, makes the agent invest more in the R&D 
process and earn a higher expected profit. The agent always prefers a larger sized project. 
Therefore, a simple way to encourage R&D is to increase the size of the project or to procure more 
from the same agent. Another obvious implication of Lemma 2 is that, relative to the first-best 
solution, underprocurement results in underinvestment in R&D. 
//.4. Optimal Incentive Procurement Contracts 
Now, we are ready to look at the principal's optimization problem and characterize optimal 
incentive procurement contracts when the principal's objective is to maximize its own expected 
welfare. The principal will choose Q (y ), P (y ), and x to maximize its expected welfare subject to the 
incentive compatibility constraint, the ex ante and interim individual rationality constraints, and the 
agent's R&D decision constraint. We will initially ignore the global incentive compatibility 
constraint Q'(y)::;; 0. If the final solution does not satisf-y Utls globai incentive co11si.raint, we need to 
use Guesnerie and Laffont's (1984) technique to get the optimal incentive contract. We do not 
repeat their arguments here. Under the local incentive compatibility constraint, the payment P (y) 
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can be solved in terms of Q (y) by using P (y) = yQ (y) + R (y) and R (y) = R (f) + r Q (J )dy . Thus, the 
optimal incentive contract is determined by solving the following optimization problem: 
(P) Max f"[s(Q(y))-Q(y)[y +�g1
1;?]]h(ylx)dy-R(Y) 
Q(y),R(y),x 
s.t. (!IR) R (f) + r Q (J )dy ;o, 0 
-
(R&D) r Q(y)H,(y lx)dy - c =0 
(EJR) r Q(y)H(y lx)dy +R(Y)-cx ;o,o 
(4) 
(5) 
The principal will choose R (f) as low as possible under the interim individual rationality constraint 
(I R ). In other word, R (Y) = 0. The agent earns zero profit if its marginal production cost is the 
publicly known jl. The principal offers a contract [P, Q] and gets the social surplus S =B (Q )-jl Q, 
where? =.Y Q and Q is determined by s'(Q)=j/. 
Since the objective function EW is concave and differentiable in Q (y) and x, and since EU is 
linear in Q (y ), concave and differentiable in x, the sufficient conditions for (P) are satisfied (see 
Theorem 8.C.5 in Takay_ama 1985). Let Q (y ), R (f), and i be the solution to the optimization 
problem (P) and EU= r Q (y)H(y li)dy +R (f)- ci be the agent's expected profit under the 
optimum contract. Then, because of the (!IR) constraint, R (y) = 0. We can show the following: 
Proposition 1: Suppose c > 0, then 0 < i < x and EU > 0. 
Proof: First, we want to show i >0. Supposei = 0 . Then Efv = S. We know Q*(y) >0 for ally 
and Q *(y) is decreasing in y. There exists at least one Q (y) > 0 such that Q (y) is decreasing in y 
and a little lower than Q*(y) for y <y and the Sil!lle as Q*(y) at y =y. Then B'(Q (y)) >B'(Q*(y))=y 
b�cause B (Q is strictly concave. Let x satisfy r Q (y )H, (y Ix )dy = c 0 and 
fY Q (y)H(y lx)dy-ci ;o,o. Theni >Osince limH,(ylx)=+=. Thus, � x� 
That is, the principal could choose [Q (y ) , i J which gives him higher welfare than S. Thus, i = O 
cannot be the optimal solution to (P  ). Therefore, i > 0. 
Second. we claim Q (y) is positive at least on a non-zero measure subset of [y, jl]. 
Otherwise, we will have r Q (y )H, (y Ii )dy = 0. Then from the (R&D) constraint, ci � 0 and hence 
c = 0. This contradicts the assumption c > 0. Thus the claim holds. Furthermore, using Inada's 
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'derivative conditions' and the assumption c > 0, we know x < x. 
Finally, we can show EU > 0. _from the (EIR) constraint, EU <: 0. We only need to show 
EU # 0. Suppose EU ; 0. Let o(x); r Q (y)H(y lx)dy - ex' then o(x) is continuous over [0, x], 
o(x); o, and o' (X); o. Since Q (y) <:a-for ally and Q (y) >O on a nonzero measure subset, and since 
H,, < o for all x E (0, x) and y E (,)>,)I), o(x) is strictly concave inx. Thus, x is a maximum point of 
o(x). For x E(O, x], o(x) 5 o(x); o, and o(O); o. In summary, we obtain O(x); o, o(O); o, and 
o(x) 5 o for any x E(O, x). These together contradict the continuity and strict concavity of o(x). 
Therefore, EU ; o(x) > 0. 
Q.E.D. 
The principal offers a production contract which allows the agent to invest a positive amount 
in R&D and to earn positive expected profits . This is a nice way to reward the agent for innovation 
since the R&D outcome cannot be observed or verified directly by the principal. It is easy to show 
that the result in Proposition 1 will not be true when either the R&D investment or the R&D 
outcome are observable to the principal. The principal will be able to extract the full surplus from 
the agent in these cases. Therefore, it is the interaction of the non-observability of the R&D 
investment and non-observability of the R&D outcome by the principal that allows the risk-neutral 
agent to earn positive profits. 
The interim individual rationality (/IR) constraint also played a key role in Proposition 1. If 
the (/IR) constraint is relaxed, R ()/) can be negative. Since j:he choice of R CY) does not affect the 
solution of Q (y) and x, the principal could choose R CY) ; r Q (y )H (y Ix )dy - ex. The agent earns a 
zero expected profit. The principal extracts the whole surPJ.us. The agent with a higher cost 
observation will end up with a negative ex post profit if it accepts the contract, and hence will drop 
out before production unless the principal can force the agent to produce. 
Let A. andµ be the multipliers associated with the constraints (EIR) and (R&D ), respectively. 
At the optimum [Q (y ), R (y), x], A.EU ; o. From Proposition 1, EU > o. Thus, A.; o. Then the 
optimal quantity Q (y ), optimal investment level x, and ii are simultaneously determined by the 
following equations: 
f' . � Q(y)H, (y lx)dy - c ;Q, 
B '(Q (y)) - ; H(y Ix) y h (y Ix) 
• H,(y Ix) 
µh(y lx)' 
Consider the-extreme case when c ; 0. In this case_ R&D is costless_ The more the a"ent - --- - -- - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - -------- ---- - . ----- - - - - - - - ---- - - - - - - - - - -Q- -
invests, the higher profit it earns because the marginal benefit of investment is positive. Thus, the 





constraint in (P) is then not binding. The agent obsetves y from the distribution H (y Ix) without any 
cost. Then, the optimal procurement amount Q 0(y) is determined by 
B'(Q (y)) = y + H(y IX). 0 h(y IX) 
(8) 
This is exactly the Baron and Myerson (1982) solution. Because of information asymmetry, there is 
an information cost H (y Ix) / h(y Ix) paid by the principal under the optimal incentive contract in 
order to induce the agent to reveal its private information y. The principal chooses the quantity 
Q 0(y) such that the marginal benefit of the quantity equals the marginal production cost plus the 
marginal information cost. There is an adverse selection effect (also see Baron and Myerson 1982 in 
the regulation context). This effect results in underprocurement as compared to the case where y is 
obsetvable to the principal. 
Suppose c > O; that is, R&D is costly. The agent invests in R&D to balance the benefits and 
costs. The (R&D) constraint is binding in this case. Formally, we have 
acn th l o(H,th l Lemma 3: SupposeH,(y Ix)> 0, 1 + a ;;, 0, and a ;;, 0 for all x E(O, x) and y E (y ,Y). y y -
Theni't>O. 
Proof: The proof is by contradiction. If i't,;; 0, then from (6), we obtainB'(Q (y))-y > 0, and 
,. • .. a(Hth) • acn,th) B (Q(y))Q <Yl=l+ ay -µ ay 
which implies that Q '(y) < 0 by the assumptions. Given Q (y ), taking the derivative of EW with 
respect to x and integrating by parts, we get 
aEw r'[·· � .. �I,=-) B (Q(y))-yj Q (y)H,(y li)dy. 
It is easy to see this term is positive because H, > 0 and Q '(y) < O. Since H,, < 0, then equation (7) 
implies that µ should be positive. This contradicts the previous hypothesis. Thus µ > o and 
oEW � 1, >0 by(7). 
Q.E.D. 
The principal wants more R&D but can not control x. The preferences for investment are 
not consistent between the agent and the principal. Moral hazard exists because the principal can not 
. . . . . . . . -· __ _ . .. _ , . -· , • H, (y Ii) " oosetve me agent·s mvesrmem aec1s10n. :>mce 11,()' IX)> u ror any y E ()' , y J, inen-µ < u. - h(y Ii) 
This negative term (moral hazard) has an opposite effect on Q (y) to the adverse selection effect 
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represented by the information cost term H(y Ii) . From (6), we can see that the combination of the h(y Ii) 
two opposite effects determines the extent to which production is carried out inefficiently (see Figure 
3). 
(Figure 3 here) 
Since ii is the multiplier for the (R&D) constraint, it can be easily shown that a� (c) = - ii 
for c > 0, whereEW(c) is the principal's expected welfare at the optimal solution [Q (y), R (y),i]. 
Under the conditions in Lemma 3, ii> 0 and hence aE� (c) < 0. Using the optimal contract, the 
more costly the R&D is, the worse-off the principal is. Thus, the principal actually pays indirectly 
for part of the R&D cost. 
Now, we compare these two cases: c = 0 and c > 0. In the following, we let Q (y) and i be 
the solution to (P) when c > 0. We have 
P . . 2 s acn ih) ,. - d - ct th . . ropos1tion : uppose ax ?: O ,or any x E (0, x) an y E Qi_, y ], an e assumptmns m 
Lemma 3 hold. Then i) Q(y) > Q0(y) for any y E()'.,f). Q ()'.) = Q0()'.). and Q (Y)?: Q0(f); ii) 
P (y) > P 0(y) for any y E Qi_, f) and P Cf)?: P 0(Y). 
Proof: From Proposition 1, 0 <i <x. Since a(��h) ?: 0 by the assumption, then 
H(y Ix) > H(y Ii) > H(y Ii) h(y lx) h<y li) h (y li) 
• H,(y Ii) 
µ h(y Ii) 
for ally E ()'..f). Comparing (6) with (8), we know B'(Q(y)) <B'(Q0(y)) and hence Q(y) > Q0(y) for 
ally E ()'. ,Y) since B (Q ) is strictly concave. When y = 2'., B '(Q {)'.)) =B '(Q0{)'.)) from (6) and (8 )  and 
thus Q ()'.) = Q0()'.). When y = f. H(Y Ix) I h(Y IX) ?:H(Y li) I h(Y li) form the assumption. 
Comparing (6) with (8), we obt.iUn Q (Y)?: Q0(Y). _ 
Since P (y) = yQ (y) + r Q (ii )dy and P 0(y) = yQ 0(y) + r Q 0(.Y )dy , then it is easy to see 
P(y) >P0(y) for any y E [y,f) and P(Y)?:P0(Y). 
Q.E.D. 
The assumption iJ(��h) ?: 0 in Proposition 2 means that the hazard rate Hlh faced by the 
principal due to the nonobservability ofR&D investment increases when the agent increases the 
level of investment. In this case, ifR&D is costly, the principal offers a higher quantity schedule 
and a higher payment schedule as well. The principal prefers a relatively bigger production project 
ifR&D is costly. 
When Q '(y)<Ofor everyy E ()'..f). there exists an inversefunctiony = Q- 1(Q). Then the 
payment P(y) can be written as P =P(Q- 1(Q)) = P(Q) given any procurement amount Q .  The agent 
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will reveal its cost information y by choosing the quantity Q. A separating incentive procurement 
contract [Q (y),P(y)] can be implemented by a simple nonlinear payment schedule P =P(Q) under 
which the agent chooses the quantity to produce. When Q '(y) = 0 over a subinterval of [)'._,fl, the 
optimal contract specifies pooling. The principal can not distinguish the different types and offers 
the same production contract. 
Compare two seperating contracts [Q (y),P (y)] and [Q 0(y),P 0(y)]. LetP (Q) sP (Q-1(Q)), 
A A -1 A A -P0(Q)sP0(Q0 (Q)),Qh sQ({'_),andQ1 sQ(.Y), then 
Proposition 3: Suppose the assumptions in Proposition 2 hold, thenP'(Q) > P� (Q) for any 
Q E(Q,,Qh)andP(Q)>Po(Q) for anyQ E [Q,,Qh]. 
Proof: First, we show p'(Q) >P�(Q) > 0 for any Q E (Q1, Qh)· By the definition of P(Q) and the 
self-selection property (or incentive compatibility), we obtain 
Similarly,P� (Q)= Qo1 (Q) > o. From Proposition 2, Q-1(Q)> Q01 (Q) for any Q E (Q1, Qh). Thus, 
p'(Q) >P�(Q) > 0 for any Q E (Q1,Qh). 
Second, we prove P(Q) >P 0(Q) for any Q E [Q1, Qh]. Since both P(Q) and P0(Q) are 
continuous and increasing in Q, and since P (Q) is steeper than P 0(Q ), we only need to show 
P(Qh) > P0(Qh) and P(Q1) >P0(Q1). In fact, since Q-1(Qh) = 2'.• we haveP(Qh) =P(Q- 1(Qh)) =PC{'_) 
and P 0(Qh) =P 0(Q01 (Q)) =P 0({'_). By Proposition 2, PC{'_)> P0({'_) and thus P (Qh) >Po(Qh). Since 
Q1 = Q (Y), theny s Q01 (Q1) < y by Proposition 2. Then P (Q1) = P(Y) = yQ (Y) = YQ1 and 
Po(Q,)=P olJ )=yQo(y ) +f Q o(yJdy. 
y 
<.YQ oCY J +CY - .Y JQoCY J = .Y Q oCY J= .YQ, 
Thus, P (Q1) > P 0(Q1 ). 
Q.E.D. 
Proposition 3 implies that with more costly R&D the principal should offer a higher and 
steeper payment schedule (see Figure 4 ). For any given quantity Q, the principal pays more in the 
case of costly R&D than that in the case of costless R&D. In other words, if the Baron-Myerson­
type contract were used when R&D is costly, the principal would buy too linle from the agent and 
pay too little to the agent. Raising the price paid raises the principal' s welfare. Therefore, whether 
R&D is costly or not certainly affects th.e principal 's decision ai1d ti"'le principal's weifare as well. 
When designing an incentive procurement contract, the principal cannot ignore the agent's private 
R&D investment behavior. 
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As we discussed before, because of an adverse selection effect, the asymmetry of 
infonnation results in an underprocurement relative to the first-best solution. R&D (or moral hazard) 
has an opposite effect on the detennination of procurement quantity to the adverse selection effect. 
When R&D is costly, the optimal quantity schedule Q (y) may still be different from the first-best 
quantity schedule Q *(y ). To end this section, we will consider a special class of R&D technologies 
and illustrate how Q (y) may be different from the first-best level Q *(y ): 
Proposition 4: Suppose H(y Ix) = 1 - [1 - F (y)]' , where x;:, 0, F (y) is an arbitrary cumulative 
distribution with the support [!>, YJ and the density function f (y ), and f (y )/[! - F (y )l is 
nonincreasing over Q:. f). Then 
i) i't >O; 
ii) if x ;:, µ,then Q (y) < Q *(y) for ally e Q: ,Y); 
iii) if x < µ,then there exists Yo eQ: ,f) such that Q (y0) = Q*(y0), Q (y) > Q *(y) 
fory e Q:.y0), and Q (y) < Q*(y) fory e (y0,Y). 
See the Appendix for the proof. The conditions in ii) and iii) are not primitive conditions. 
They depend on the structure of the benefit function B (Q) and distribution function F (y ). Because 
of the interaction of the adverse selection effect and the moral hazard effect, there is a possibility that 
the optimal quantity Q (y) is higher than the first-best quantity Q*(y) for lower marginal costs. But 
for higher marginal costs, the optimal quantity Q (y) is lower than the first-best quantity. That is, 
there is underprocurement relative to the first-best when the marginal cost is relatively high. 
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III. COMPETITION FOR PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS 
Some defense procurements are organized so that many suppliers compete for the right to be 
the sole contractor on the production of the good to be procured. In order to get the procurement 
contract, potential firms will invest in R&D activities and become informed about the potential 
product and technologies before the competitive bidding starts. How does the procurement contract 
affect R&D behavior? Does the optimal quantity to be procured depend on the number of bidders? 
Does the total expenditure on R&D and the pace of innovation depend on the structure of the 
industry? Does competition improve production efficiency and R&D efficiency? In this part of the 
paper, we extend the analysis in Part II and discuss the effects of competition on R&D expenditures 
and procurement contracts. We will first describe a basic model which is an extension of the 
principal-agent model in Part II, and study the Nash equilibrium behavior ofR&D expenditures for 
an arbitrary incentive procurement contract. Then we characterize the optimal incentive contract and 
discuss properties of this contract. 
Ill.I. The Model 
Suppose that there is one buyer and n firms, where n is exogenous.8 The benefit function for 
the buyer B = B (Q) is the same as before. The production cost function for firm i is c, (Q) = y, Q, 
where y, is constant marginal cost and is unknown to the buyer and all firms before R&D. But each 
firm can observe its own marginal cost by investing in R&D. Suppose that firm i invests (capital) x; 
and observes y, which is drawn from a cumulative distribution H (y, Ix,) with the density function 
h (y, Ix,) and the support �,fl. The R&D outputs among different firms are independently and 
identically distributed.9 The R&D cost for firm i is ex,, where c > 0 is a known constant. Each 
firm's R&D output is only observed by itself, but not observed by the buyer and other firms. 
Therefore, each firm has private information about its R&D output and will use this information 
strategically if it is optimal to do so. 
At the beginning of the R&D stage, the buyer announces a payment schedule Q = Q (b) and 
promises that the firm with the lowest bid fj by an exogenously given date will get the contract 
[Q (b), Q(b)b].10 We want to determine the optimal payment schedule Q = Q ( b) for the buyer. 
Under this contract, firm i 's strategy will be b; = b; (y;), i = 1, ... , n. Since firms are symmetric and 
the contract is also symmetric, it is reasonable to consider symmetric equilibrium b, = b(y;) only. If 
as is usually the case, the bidding function b (y1) is increasing function, then the firm with the lowest 
bid ii is the firm with the lowest marginal cost y.  In these cases, we only have to consider incentive 
compatible direct revelation contracts [Q(y), P(y)], where P(y) = Q (y)b(y) and y is the lowest 
marginal cost. The timing of the game is then as follows: First, the buyer announces production 
contracts [Q (y ), P (y )] and promises that the firm with the lowest (reported) marginal cost y by an 
exogenously given date will be awarded a contract [Q (Y ), P (Y )]. Second, each firm invests and 
observes its marginal cost y, at the given date. Then the firm with the lowest marginal cost y gets 
the contract. Finally, the winning firm produces Q (Y) and gets paid by P (Y ). 
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We want truthful reporting to be a noncooperative Nash equilibrium. Given that other films 
report true information, firm i reports y( which depends on its true information y, . We denote its 
strategy as y( ; q,, (y, ). Then the probability of firm i winning is 
Ki,y(I x_;) = Pr(y( ,,;, yj , j * i , j  ; 1 , · · · , n )  
where Yj is a random variable and represents firm j's R&D outcome ( marginal cost). The e x  ante 
profits for firm i from using strategy q,, l,y;) and x, given that the other firms use x_, and y _, is 
EU; ( <!>; l,y) I x1 , . . .  , x.) ; t [ P ( <!>; l,y )) -yQ (cj>, 1,y ))) K (cj>,l,y) I x_;)hl,y lx;)dy - ex; . 
Similar to Lemma 1 in Section II.3, the necessary and sufficient conditions for firm i to tell the truth 
(cj>, l,y); y for all y )  are that Q'l,y) I Ql,y) ,,;,Lj .,hj I (1 -Hj) and that the payment P( y )  is 
Pl,y) ; yQ l,y )+r Q(J)K(J lx_;)dy !Kl,y Ix_,). ( 9 ) 
For the truth-telling Nash equilibrium, we can simply write firm i 's ex ante profits EU; (x1, • . . •  x.) as 
EU; (x 1, • • •  , x.);r Ql,y)Kl,y lx_;)Hl,y lx;)dy - cx;. ( 10) 
We will look at noncooperative Nash equilibrium behavior in R&D expenditures for both an 
arbitrary incentive contract and the optimal incentive contracts in the next sections. Since most of 
results will depend on the structure of the R&D technology, we first classify R&D technology: 
Condition (A): For any y E (,)'., jl), - log[l -H l,y Ix)] is linear in x(x ;;;, 0). 
Condition ( B): For any y e (,)'., jl), - Iog[l -H l,y Ix)] is strictly concave in x(x ;;;, 0). 
Lemma 4: Condition (A) is equivalent to H l,y Ix); I - [1 - F l,y )]',where x ;;;, O and F l,y) is an 
arbitrary cumulative distribution function over Q'., y ]. 
The proof is quite straightforward and is omitted here. Suppose that a firm has a prior 
distribution F l,y) about its marginal production cost y .  The firm can do an experiment with a fixed 
cost c and observe marginal cost y 1 which is drawn from the distribution F l,y ). If this experiment 
can be repeated k times independently, then the firm observes a sequence of the marginal cost 
realizations ( y 1, . . . ·�, y"). The firm will choose the mi:ni..tnum marginal cost ym. From statistical 
theory, ym is a realization of a random variable ( the minimum-order statistic) with the distribution 
H l,y lk) ; 1 - [1 - F  l,y )J'. Thus, we have an independent search process. Rob (1986) used a similar 
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optimal search model of R&D behavior in procurements. In general, we can allow k = x to be an 
continuous variable and to represent the expenditure on R&D. This R&D process of marginal cost 
reduction is just an independent search process. The first x dollars have the same effect on the 
minimum marginal cost as the last x dollars. To some extent, this process is subject to constant 
marginal returns in the number of experiments or expenditures. Similarly, condition (B) represents 
R&D processes which exhibit diminishing marginal returns to expenditures. Diminishing marginal 
returns to scale may be a good description of most R&D processes in reality. A relatively simple 
form that satisfies (B) is 
Condition (B 1): Hly Ix) = 1 - [1 -Fly)rM, where x ;;,  0, Fly) is an arbitrary cumulative 
distribution function over [y , y], a(x) > 0, a"(x) < 0, a(O) = 0, and a(O) = + =. 
It is easy to check that (B 1) satisfies condition (B), so a (B 1) technology exhibits diminishing 
marginal returns to expenditures on R&D. In this case, with the belief that y is drawn from a 
distribution Fly), the firm could not make an independent experiment and then simply take the 
lowest marginal cost observation. The later experiments are not as productive as the earlier 
experiments. Let Fly)= 1 - e-Y over [O, =), then Hly Ix)= 1 - e-a(x)y which is also an exponential 
distribution. This distribution is adopted in the literature on stochastic R&D races (see Reinganum 
1988 for a survey). Diminishing marginal returns to scale is also assumed in this literature. 
lll.2. Arbitrary Incentive Contract 
Consider an arbitrary direct revelation (possibly non-optimal) contract [Q ly ), Ply)], which is 
assumed to be independent of n in this section. Under this contract, if truth-telling is a Nash 
equilibrium, then each firm's expected profits can be written as (10). At the beginning of the R&D 
stage, each firm chooses an investment level to maximize its expected profits. If lnada's 'derivative 
conditions' are satisfied, the Nash equilibrium (x1, • • •  , x.) satisfies the first order condition: 
r Q ly)Kly lx_;)Hx,ly lx;)dy - c =O (11) 
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n ,  where H, is the derivative of H ly; Ix;) with respect to x;. Since EU; is concave in 
, 
x; , the second order conditions are satisfied. 
Under condition (A), the equilibrium condition (11) becomes 
-r Q ly)[l -Fly)Ylog[l -Fly)]dy = c (12) 
n 
which is the same for all firms, where x = L x; is the total expenditure on R&D. Given Q ly ), the 
i =1 
equilibrium condition (12) determines x. Both symmetric and asymmetric Nash equilibria on R&D 
n 
expenditures exist and the total expenditure x = L x; determined by (12) is independent of n ,  the 
i = 1 
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number of firms. The total expenditure is the same under different equilibria. The expected 
minimum marginal cost is 
r' n E(ym Ix) =- )._ yd11}1 [1 -H(y Ix;)] 
It is also independent of the number of finns. Therefore, we get the same invariance results as Sah 
and Stiglitz (1987) do. 
In our model, firms compete for a profitable production contract instead of a prize with a 
fixed rent as in Sah and Stiglitz and other models in the R&D races literature. An incentive 
production contract [Q (y ), P (y )] can generate a profit R (y) = P (y) -yQ (y) which decreases with the 
R&D outcome y (the marginal cost). The winning finn is not just awarded a prize, it will get a better 
prize if its R&D outcome is of higher quality. This can be viewed as being similar to a variable 
patent system in private markets. The reason we have the invariance result here is quite intuitive. 
Remember that each firm has the same R&D technology and does R&D independently. The R&D 
technology exhibits constant marginal returns to expenditures and it is just like an independent 
search process. Therefore, when one finn does k experiments, it has the same effect on the observed 
minimum marginal production cost as if k firms each did one experiment. When the prize is 
predetermined and independent of the number of finns, the total number of experiments or total 
R&D expenditure for all firms is independent of the number of firms. Under this specified 
environment, one firm will do what n firms will do. Therefore, it is not surprising to get the 
invariance result under the particular R&D technology. Later, we will show that if the R&D 
technology exhibits diminishing marginal returns to expenditures or if the buyer chooses the 
incentive contract optimally, the above invariance result does not hold. We would conjecture that if 
the R&D technologies among firms are dependent, the invariance result does not hold either. 
If the R&D process exhibits diminishing marginal returns to expenditures on R&D, Nash 
equilibrium behavior on R&D expenditure will be different from above. We first show that each 
firm will invest the same a.'Ilount in equilibrium. 
Proposition 5: Under condition (B), i) only a symmetric Nash equilibrium on R&D expenditures 
exists; ii) the individual expenditure x (n) decreases with n ;  and iii) lim x (n) = 0. 
n-'>oo 
Proof: We first show that any Nash equilibrium (i1 , • • .  , i,) at the R&D stage is symmetric. If not, 
there exists i * j such that i1 * i; , i1 > O and i; > 0. Since i1 and i; satisfy (1 1), we get 
[; n f H,(y li1) Q (y) II [l -H(y lik)] ' 
, 
_ k = l 1 -H(v lx,) 
L v . ,  
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Condition ( B) implies that H, (y Ix) I [1 -H(y Ix)] is decreasing in x for all x > 0 andy E \l'._, j). Then 
the above equation cannot be true. This contradiction implies that any Nash equilibrium is 
symmetric. 
Let x(n) be the the individual R&D expenditure, then the equilibrium condition (11 )  
becomes 
r Q (y)[l -H(y lx(n))]" - 1H, (y lx(n))dy = c. (1 1') 
Considering n as a real variable and taking the derivatives of both sides of (11) with respect to n ,  we 
obtain 
a��) t Q (y)[I -H(y lx(n))]" -2[ [1 -H(y lx(n))]H,,(y lx(n)) + (I - n)H}(y lx(n))J dy 
+ r Q (y)[l -H(y lx(n))]" - 1H,(y lx(n))log[l -H(y lx(n))]dy = 0. 
Condition (B) implies that (1 -H)H,, +Hf< 0 for all x > 0 and y E (y, y). Thus, axa
(n) :;:; O; that is, - n 
x (n ) decreases with n .  
Furthermore, {x(n)} is a monotonic decreasing sequence with the lower bound 0. Then there 
exists a limit x0 ;;, 0 of the sequence when n approaches infinity. We will show thatx0 = 0. If not, 
then H (y I xo) > O for y > ,!' by the assumption and hence [1 -H (y I x(n ))]" - 1 � O for y > ,!' when 
n � =. Let n � = in equation (11\ we get c = 0 which contradicts to c > 0 by the assumption. 
Therefore, x ( n) � x0 = 0. 
Q.E.D. 
When more firms enter the R&D race game, each existing firm will invest less in R&D. In 
the limit, the individual expenditure approaches zero. 
It is not clear how the total expenditure and the pace of innovation depend on the number of 
firms under diminishing marginal returns to expenditure. In a special case of (B), we find the 
following dependence result which differs from Sah and Stiglitz (1987): 
Proposition 6: Under (B 1), i) E(y"' lx(n)) decreases with n ;  ii) Jim E(y"' lx(n)) = y ,  where n-;o<><> -
E(y"' lx(n)) = ,!' + r [I -F(y)]•aCx<•>>dy is the expected minimum marginal cost. 
Proof Under condition (B 1), the Nash equilibrium on R&D expenditures is symmetric by 
Proposition 5. Let x(n) be the individual equilibrium expenditure, then the equilibrium condition 
(1 1 )  can be written as 
r Q (y )[I - F  (y )]•a<x<•>>1og[l -F (y )]dy = - clrx'(x(n )). (1 1 ") 
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B y  Proposition 5, x (n) decreases with n and x(n) � 0 when n � =. Since a(x) is strictly concave 
function, (li") implies that na(x(n)) increases with n . It is easy to calculate the expected minimum 
marginal cost as the following: 
E(y"' lx(n)) = -f yd[t -F(y)J•a(x(•)) 
= 2' + r [1 -F (y )]na<x<nl>dy 
which decreases with n .  Since a'(O) = + = from the assumption, then a'(x(n )) � + =. From (l t''), it 
must be na(x(n)) � + =. Thus, E(y"' lx(n)) � 2' · 
Q.E.D. 
Because of diminishing marginal returns to expenditures the cost reduction by each firm is 
limited. But different firms can do R&D independently. When more and more firms invest in R&D, 
minimum marginal costs are expected to be reduced. In the limit, the expected minimum marginal 
cost could reach the lower bound 2'. But at the same time, the total expenditures on R&D may 
increase with the number of firms. As a particular example, let a(x) = xa, O < a <  1, and let 
Q (y) = -f (y)!log[l -F(y)]. Assume that /(y) < 0 for y E (y, f), then it is easy to check that 
Q'(y) :'> 0. The global incentive condition is satisfied. In thi� case, the equilibrium condition ( 1 1 )  
becomes 
nx(n) + x(n)1 -a =ale. 
When a= I, the total expenditure is nx(n) = lie , which is independent of n as we showed before. 
But for 0 < a < I , nx(n) varies with n .  From Proposition 5, we know that x(n) decreases with n and 
x (n) � 0 when n � + =. From the above equation, we obtain that nx (n) increases with n and 
nx (n ) � ale when n � + =. Thus, the total expenditure nx (n) increases with the number of firms 
and has a finite limit in this example. Therefore, when the R&D technology exhibits diminishing 
marginal returns to expenditures, more competition with a finite amount of total expenditures on 
R&D could reduce the marginal production cost to the lower bound. 
///.3. Optimal Incentive Contract 
Under the incentive condition (9), we can easily calculate the buyer's expected utility 
EW(Q(y),x1, .  . .  , x.). The buyer will choose quantity Q (y) and R&D expenditures (x1, .  • .  , x.) to 
maximize its expected utility EW subject to the firms' individual rationality constraints, self­
selection constraints, and the Nash equilibrium conditions on R&D expenditures. An optimal 
incentive contract \Vill be detennined by t.lie follo\ving optimization problem: 
(P.) Max r [ [ B (Q(y)) -yQ (y)] ;�i K(y lx_;)h(y Ix;) - Q (y) ;�i K(y lx_;)H(y Ix_;)] dy 
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Q (y), Xv . . .  , Xn 
s.t. r Q (y)K(y lx_,)Hx,(y lx;)dy - c = 0, i = l, . . . , n 
rQ(y)K(y lx_;)H(y lx;)dy - cx, 2' 0, i = I, . . . , n  
(1 1) 
(13) 
where the global incentive constraint is ignored. Guesnerie and Laffont's (1984) argument can be 
used if the global incentive constraint does not hold for the solution to (P .). We can see that when 
n = 1 the optimization problem (P.) is just (P ) which we discussed in Section II.4. EU; is strictly 
concave in x,, EU; = O when x, = 0, and EU, > 0 for some x, > 0 and for any nontrivial distribution 
H (y Ix). Thus, for an interior solution x, > 0 of (P .), the individual rationality constraint (13) must 
be nonbinding. In order to encourage each finn to do R&D, positive ex ante profits are required. 
Let µ, and A., be the multipliers for (11) and (13), respectively, then A.; = 0 for all i because of 
the nonbinding constraints (13). The necessary conditions for the optimal procurement quantity 
Q (y) and R&D expenditures (x1, • • .  , x.) are 
n 
1; K(y lx_,)H(y Ix;) 
s '(Q(y)) =y + �•
=-'.1 ____ _ 
1; K(y lx_,)h(y Ix;) i = 1 
n 
1; µ,K(y lx_,)H,(y Ix;) ' i = l  
n 
L K(y lx_,)h(y Ix,) i = 1 
(14) 
t [ B'(Q (y)) - y] Q '(y)K(y lx_,)Hx,(y lx,)dy = µ; t Q (y)K(y lx_,)Hx,x,(y lx;)dy (15) 
Thus, equation systems (9), (1 1), (14), and (15) simultaneously detennine the optimal contract 
[Q (y ), P (y )], the optimal R&D expenditures (x1 • • . • •  x.), and the multipliers (µ1 , . • •  , µ.). 
Lemm S· If l _Q_ ' _Q_ ' > 
[ 1;K(y lx_,)H(y Ix,)] r K(y !x_,)H, (y Ix; ) ]  
a . + iJy fK(y lx_,)h(y lx;) > O and iJy l v(y lx_,)h(y lx;) _ O for all 
y ,  x h , . . . •  x. and all i ,  then there exists at least one j such that µi > 0. 
Proof: The proof is by contradiction and similar to the proof of Lemma 3. If not, then µi ,,; O for all 
j.  From (14), we obtain B'(Q (y)) - y  > 0 and 
f 1;K(y lx_,)H(y lx;)l r r K(y lx ·)H (y lx· ) l l " a i a _, � , B (Q (y)) = l +  iJy 1;K(y lx_;)h(y lx;) -7 µ; iJy 1:K(y lx_,)h(y lx;) 
l ' J l ' '  J j  
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By the assumption, the above equation implies Q '(y) < 0. Thus, 
dEW fY [ , � ' 
a;- =- ) B (Q(y)) - yJ Q (y)K(y lx_, )H,,(y lx, )dy > 0  ' -
Since H,, < 0, then (15) implies µ, > 0. This is a contradiction. Therefore, there exists at least one j , , 
such that µj > 0. 
Q.E.D. 
It may not be easy to interpret the assumptions in Lemma 5. But if we restrict our attention 
to technologies (A ) or (B 1) we can provide a standard condition. Under technology (A) or (B 1), from 
(15) it can be shown that µ1 = · · · = µ. = µ. Then the assumptions in Lemma 5 become much 
simpler: 
Lemma 6; Under R&D technology (A) or (B 1), if f (y )/[I -F (y )l is nonincreasing in y ,  then µ > 0. 
The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 5 and is omitted here. Since 
h(y lx)![l -H (y Ix)] = a(x)f (y)![l -F(y)] under technology (A ) or (B 1), the condition in Lemma 6 
means that for any investment level x the hazard rate h(y lx)![l -H(y Ix)] is nonincreasing in y ,  
which is the standard regularity condition. Under condition (A), (14) and (15) become 
B'(Q (y)) = y + 1 f ��) [ ,;, [1 -F(y)('' - n + nµJog[l -F (y)]J (14') 
r [ B'(Q (y)) - y] Q'(y)[l -F (y)]'log[l -F(y)]dy 
= µf Q(y)[l -F (y)]'1og2r1 -F(y)]dy (15') 
Thus, the optimal procurement quantity, equilibrium R&D expenditures, and µ are simultaneously 
determined by (12), (14\ and (15'). We have the following results: 
Proposition 7: Under condition (A), if f (y)![l -F(y)] is nonincreasing in y ,  then the optimal 
procurement quantity depends on the number of potential firms, as do the total expenditure and the 
pace of innovation. 
Therefore, in the presence of costly R&D investments, the optimal procurement quantity is 
dependent on ihe number of potential firms . This contrasts with Riordan and Sappington (1987), 
and Dasgupta and Spulber (1987) who find that the optimal quantity schedule does not depend on the 
number of the firms in awarding monopoly franchises and in normal procurements, respectively. 
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But no R&D behavior was considered in their models. In the presence of R&D behavior, the design 
of incentive contracts is based upon the buyer's belief about the firms' private information (the R&D 
outcome). Thus, investment behavior actually has some influence on procurement contracts. The 
number of potential firms plays an important role in determining the optimal procurement quantity 
and the investment level. But how the optimal quantity and the R&D expenditure depend on the 
number of firms in this case is not clear. 
Let EW (n) be the principal 's expected welfare under the optimal incentive contract, then we 
know 
Proposition 8: Under conditions in Lemma 6, dE:,(n) 1 .  = I > 0. 
In other word, the principal prefers that more than one firm participate in R&D and bid for the 
procurement contract. It is not clear whether the government is always better-off when more firms 
participate in R&D and compete for the contract. What we know is the following: 
Proposition 9: Suppose that the conditions in Proposition 7 hold, and that the optimal solution 
n 
Q.(y) and L x; have limits Q 0(y ) ;:;,  0 and x0 ;:;, O when n ---? =, respectively, and Q.(y) decreases with 
i = l 
y .  Then B'(Q0(y)) = y  and lim E (ym lx(n)) = y0 > y .  
n�oo -
We have ex post production efficiency in the limit, that is, marginal benefit equals marginal 
cost given the technology, but the expected minimum marginal cost might increase with the number 
of firms because Q. (y) and hence nx (n) might decrease with n .  The expected minimum marginal 
cost may not reach the lower bound � in the limit. Thus, in the case of costly R&D, more 
competition improves production efficiency, but may discourage R&D. Production may be socially 
more efficient but at a relatively higher R&D cost.11 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, we have created a basic model of the R&D and production process. We have 
examined what should happen if the government manages and controls the R&D stage indirectly by 
awarding an appropriate production contract. The optimal production contract is characterized to 
maximize the government's expected welfare given that each firm has incentives to invest in R&D 
and to report its true private information. There exists inefficiency in procurements because of 
unobservable R&D outcomes and moral hazard in R&D activities. Costly R&D has an opposite 
effect on the production decision to the adverse selection effect (Baron and Myerson 1982). If the 
Baron-Myerson type contract is used in this case, the government buys too little and pays too little as 
ccmpa..red \Vit.li its optimUtTi. Therefore, t.11e goverrunent prefers to take into account tl1e pre-contract 
R&D behavior when offering a procurement contract. 
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The analysis of the competition case shows that the number of competing firms matters. The 
optimal incentive production contract offered by the govermnent depends on the number of firms. 
This is in sharp contrast to Riordan and Sappington (1987) and Dasgupta and Spulber (1987) where 
no R&D behavior has been considered. The total expenditures on R&D and the pace of innovation 
in the industry are also dependent of the number of firms. This is different from the invariance result 
of Sah and Stiglitz (1987) where firms do R&D and compete for a fixed rent in a Bertrand market. 
The govermnent prefers more than one firm to invest in private R&D and to compete for the 
production contract. In general, competition among a large number of suppliers in procurements 




Application of the Revelation Principle: In general, the principal first announces a mechanism 
[Q (m), P (m),M ,  x], where M is the message space, m E M  is the message that the agent sends to the 
principal, and x is the principal's proposal to the agent. Given this mechanism, the agent takes an 
action x and observes his type y .  Then the agent sends a message m = <j>(y) E M to the principal. 
Finally, the principal asks the agent to produce Q(<!>(y)) and pays him P (<j>(y)). Since P ,  Q ,  and x are 
continnous variables and are chosen from convex sets, we only need to consider pure strategies of 
Q (.), P (.), and x . The principal' s problem is to design a mechanism [Q (m ), P (m ), M , x J to 
Maximize EW = r [ B [Q (<j>(y))] -P(<j>(y))J d.H(y Ix) 
s.t. [<j>(y),x] E argmax EU = t [P(iji (y)) -yQ ((ji(y))J d.H(y Ix ) - cJC. 
A mechanism is direct if and only if M = (11 , jl]. An optimal incentive compatible direct 
revelation mechanism [Q (y ), P (y ), x J is the one that 
Maximizes EW = r [ B (Q (y)) -P (y)] d.H(y Ix) 
(*) 
s.t. [<!>(y )=y , x] E argmax EU =f' [P (iji(y)) - yQ (iji(y))] dH(y lx ) - cJC. (**) 
The Revelation Principle in this context says that, given any (agent's) optimal strategy 
[<j>(y),x] in any mechanism [Q (m), P (m), M, x], there exists an incentive compatible direct revelation 
mechanism [Q*(y), P*(y), x*] in which the principal gets the same expected welfare as in the given 
optimal strategy of the given mechanism. To see why this is true, we define Q*(y) " Q  (<j>(y)), 
P*(y) =P (<!>()')), and x* = x given the mechanism [Q (m), P (m),M ,  x] and the agent's optimal 
strategy [<j>(y ), x ]. Then 
EW* = r [ B (Q*(y)) -P*(y J] dH(y Ix*) 
= ( [B [Q (<j>(y))] -P (<j>(y))J d.H(y Ix) 
=EW 
That is, the principal has the same expected welfare under these two mechanisms. Now, if 
[Q *(y ), P*(y ), x*] does not satisfy the incentive compatibility condition (**), then [(ji(y) = y ,  x = x*] 
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does not maximize 
EU = f" [P*((ji(y)) - yQ *((ji(y))J dH(y I x ) - ex 
=r [p [<J>((ji(y))] - yQ [<J>((ji(y))]J dH(y I x ) - ex 
where (ji 1(y ) = <J>((ji (y)). That is, [(ji1(y ) = <J>(y), x = x] does not maximize 
f [P ((ji 1(y)) - yQ ((ji 1(y))J dH(y l x ) - C.X  
That violates the condition (*). Thus, [Q *(y ), P *(y ), x*] is incentive compatible. 
Proof of Lemma 1: First, if <J>(y) = y is the agent firm's optimal strategy, the necessary condition is 
ilR (y , <J>)h (y Ix) 
il<I> 
l <i>=y = O  
for all x and y ,  i.e. i)R �· <I>) I <i>=y = 0 for all y .  The second order condition can be written as 
()2R
a$' <1>
) I <i>=y S O for all y .  Combining these two conditions, we get Q'(y ) S O for all y E ()> ,y]. 
Let R (y ) = R (y , y), then P (y) = yQ (y) + R (y) and R '(y ) =  ilR�, <i>) I <i>=y = - Q (y). 
On the other hand, given that Q'(y) s 0 and P (y) =yQ (y) + R (y) for_all y E [y ,y], we can 
show that R (y) <oR (y, <!>) for any y ,  <I> E ()>. y]. In fact, since R (y) = R (.Y) + r Q (ji )dy
-
, for <I> >  y we 
have 
R (y ) - R (<J>) = t  Q (ji )dy 
<o Q (<i>)(<J> - y) = R  (y , <1>) - R  (<!>) 
where the inequality is true because Q (y) is nonincreasing in y .  We get R (y) <oR (y , <J>). The same is 
true for any <l> < y .  Thus, for any y E ()>,.YJ, once <J>(y) E Q> • .YJ, we have R (y) <o R (y ,  <J>(y)) which 
implies 
f R (y)h (y lx)dy - ex <o J' R (y ,  <J>(y))h (y lx)dy - ex 
� � 
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since h (y Ix) 2' 0 for all x, y .  Therefore, truth-telling is the optimal strategy for the agent. 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Lemma 2: Suppose the conclusion in Lemma 2 does not hold, i.e. x*(Q) < x*(Q ). From 
the first order condition, we get 
- -
r Q (y)H, (y lx*(Q ))dy = r Q (y)H,(y lx*(Q ))dy 
<f Q(y)H,(y lx*(Q ))dy 
because H, > 0. This implies that 
I' Q (y)[ H,(y lx*(Q)) -H,(y lx*(Q ))) dy < 0. 
But H,, < 0 and x*(Q) < x*(Q ) imply H,(y lx*(Q )) 2'H,(y lx*(Q )) for all y E (J:. YJ. The above 
inequality cannot be true. This is a contradiction. Thus, x*(Q) 2' x*(Q ). 
Let EU and EU be the expected utilities for the firm under these two contracts, respectively. 
When R (f) = R (f) we get 
EU -EU = r [ Q (y)H(y lx*(Q )) - Q (y)H(y Ix*)) dy - cx*(Q )) + cx*(Q)) 
Sr Q(y)[ H(y lx*(Q )) -H(y lx*(Q ))) dy - c[x*(Q )) -x*(Q))) 
Using Taylor's expansion, there exists � E [0, x] such that 
H(y lx*(Q )) -H(y lx*(Q)) =H, (y lx*(Q))o +H,,(y 1 �)021 2, 
where o = x*(Q ) -x*(Q ). Substituting these two equations into the above inequality, we get 
EU -EU s [f Q(y)H,(y lx*(Q)) - c] o +  fo2 r Q (y)H,,(y l�)dy. 
The first term on the right hand side equals zero by the first order condition, and the second term is 
no larger than zero. Thus, EU 2' EU . 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 4: Since H(y Ix)= 1 - [1 -F(y)Y for all x 2' 0 and y E [)', YJ, then 
H (y Ix) 
h (y Ix) 
H,(y Ix) 
h (y Ix) 
[l - F (y)]1 -x  - [1 -F (y)] 
x f (y) 
[l - F (y )]log[l - F (y )] 
x f (y) 
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a[ H(y lx)!h (y Ix)] 
()y 
= _!_ [1 - (1 - x)[l - F (y)r'] - ..fill_ [ [l - F (y)]1 -x  - [1 - F(y)]J 
x xf2(y) 
a [ H, (y lx)!h(y Ix)] 
()y 
= _!_ + _!_ log[l - F (y)][l + j'(y )[l - F(y)]] 2' O. x x J2(y) 
The above two inequalities hold because of the assumption 1 E � & ) is nonincreasing in y .  The 
conditions in Lemma 3 are satisfied and thus ft > O by Lemma 3. Now let 
<!>(y) = H (y li) - iJH, (y Ii) 
= 1 - [l - F (y )]' + Jl[l -F (y )J'Iog[l - F (y )]. 
Then <!>\)'.) =  0, <l>(f) = 1, and 
q,'(y) = [l - F (y )]' - 1f (y)[ i - ft - ftxiog[l - F (y)]J 
If i 2' ft, then <1>' (y) > 0 for all y e (y, jl). Thus, <l>(y) > q,(y) = 0. That is, 
H (y li) - iJH,(y Ii) > 0 for all y e Q: . f). Since B"(Q ) < 0, from
-
(1) and (6) we obtain Q (y)  < Q*(y) 
for all y e \)'. ,  f). 
If i < ft, then there exists a y e \)'. , f) such that 
ii-x 
F(J ) = l - e- µ_, 
Thus, q,'(y) < 0 fory <'J and q,'(y) > 0 for y > y .  Since <!>\)'.) =  0, then <!>(y) < 0 for some y > �· But we 
know <l>(f) = 1. Thus there exists a y0 e \)'., y) such that <!>(y0) = 0, <l>(y ) < 0 for y < y0, and cp(y) > 0 for 
y > y0• Therefore, from (1) and (6) we have Q (y0) = Q*(y0), Q (y) > Q*(y) for y E <z, y0), and 
Q (y) < Q *(y) for all y  e (y0,f]. 
Q.E.D. 
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Proof of Proposition 7: We show this result for symmetric Nash equilibrium ofR&D expenditure. 
Under condition (A), the optimal quantity Q (y), equilibrium R&D expenditures, and µ are 
simultaneously determined by (12), (14'), and (15\ If the optimal quantity schedule Q (y) is 
independent of n for any y ,  then from (12) we know that the total expenditure x is also independent 
of n .  This together with (15) implies that µ is independent of n .  Consider the symmetric 
equilibrium of R&D expenditure. Let x (n) be the equilibrium individual expenditure. Talcing the 
derivative of both sides of (14) with respect to n ,  we get 
0= [ze' -e '  + 1 + _!:!::_] ilx(n) _l_ x(n) iln x(n)2 (14") 
for all y E Q>, y), where y ( > ,rl represents the marginal cost level of the marginal firm and is 
independent of n ,  and z = z (y )=-x(n)log[l -F(y)] > 0  fory E (1>,Y). Let cjl(z )= ze' - e' + 1 + _!:!::_, x(n) 
then 
d cj>[z (y )] = (ze' + _H:._) x.f (y ) dy Xn 1 -F(y) 
cannot be zero for all y E Q>, Y) since µ > 0 by Lemma 6. Thus cjl(z (y )) cannot be zero for all 
y E (y , Y). Since x = nx(n) is independent of n ,  aa
x. is not zero. Thus, (14') cannot be true. The - n 
contradiction implies that Q (y) does depend on n . 
From (12) again, the total expenditure i!.l R&D x will depend on n .  Since the expected 
minimum marginal cost equals E(ym Ix)=,[ + r [l -F(y)]'dy ,  it also depends on n .  
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 8: Under technology (B 1), the Nash equilibrium of R&D expenditures is 
asymmetric by Proposition 5. Under technology (A), we consider symmetric equilibrium only. At 
the optimum solution [Q (y),R ff),i] to (P.), the buyer's expected welfare can be written as 
EW(n )=n f [B (Q(y)) -yQ(y)] [1 -H(y li)] " - 1dlf(y Ii) 
-n r Q (y)[l -H(y lx)]" - 1H(y li)dy. 
Viewing n as a continuous variable at this moment, we obtain 
dEW(n) 





[ il�W iJQ (.)] = n  fY [l -H(y li)]" - 1 ilQ(y) [B'(Q (y)) - _ H(y li)] dH(y li) iJQ (.) iln 1' iln y h(y Ii) 
The last equality holds due to (14). Integrating (8.1) by parts, we can rewrite EW(n) as 
EW(n) =B (Q) -l_Q + ( [ s'(Q (y)) -y] Q'(y)[l -H(y li)]"dy 
Then 
-1' Q (y)[l -H(y Ii)]" - 1[ 1 + (n - l)H(y Ix)) dy. 
iJEW fY [ • •  l ., 1 
ili = - n j- B (Q (y)) - yJ Q (y)[l -H(y li)]" - H,(y li)dy 
- (n - 1) r Q (y)[l -H(y li)]" - 1H,(y li)dy 
=-nµf Q(y)[l -H(y li)]"- 1Hu(y li)dy 
+ n (n - 1) r Q(y)[l -H(y li)]"-2H,(y li)H(y li)dy. 
Taking the derivatives of both sides of (11) with respect to n ,  we get 
r iJ��) [1 -H(y li)]" - 1H, (y li)dy + r Q(y)[l -H(y li)]" - 1Hu(y li)dy �! 
-(n -1) fY Q (y )[l -H (y Ii)]" -2H}(y li)dy ili i � 
+ r Q (y)[l -H(y li)]"- 1H,(y li)log[l -H(y li)]dy = 0. 






[ iJ� iJQ(.)] + iJEW i!i =-n (n - I)ii fY Q(y)[l -H(y li)]" -2Hf(y li)dy i!i 
iJQ (.) i!n iJi i!n i i!n 
+niif Q (y)[l -H(y li)]" - 1H,(y li)log[l -H(y li)]dy 
+ n (n - !) ( Q (y)[l -H(y Ii)]" -2h(y li)H,(y li)dy �! 
On the other hand, we have 
a:;=[' [ s'(Q (y)) - y] Q'(y)[I -H(y Ji)J"Iog[I -H(y li)Jdy 
-!' Q (y)[l -H(y li)]"- 1[ I +  (n - l)H(y Ix)] log[! -H(y li)]dy 
-r Q (y)[l -H(y li)]" - 1H(y li)dy 
(8.7) 
(8.8) 
LetH(y Ix)= I - u (y)a<x), where u(y) = 1 -F(y), a(x) ;;, o, a'(x) > 0, a"(x) s o, and a(O) = 0. When 
a(x) =x ,  H(y Ii) represents technology (A). When a"(x) < 0, H(y Ix) represents technology (B 1). 
Substituting this distribution into (8.7) and (8.8), and combining with (8.2), we obtain the following 
where 
dEW(n) 
dn (n - 1) 
iJ(na(i)) r' Q(y)u(y)(n - l)a(i)g ,(y)logu(y)dy i!n i 
+ µ a(i��'(x) r' Q (y)u(y)"a(i)logu (y)dy a(x) i 
g 1 (y) = u (y )a(x) - I - iici(x)u (y )aCxlJogu (y) 
g2(y) = u (y )a(x) - 1 - a(i)logu (y) 




Since µ>0  by Lemma 6, ci'(x) ,:; 0 by assumptions, and logu (y) < 0 aud g2(y) > 0 for all y E ()>,J), 
(8.10) implies dE: (n) I n =  1 > 0. 
Q.E.D. 
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Proof of Proposition 9: We consider syrnrnetri equilibrium only. First, since I; x, = nx(n) has a 
finite limit x0 ;;;, 0 by the assumption, then when n � = we obtain 
- -
E(ym l x (n)) =�  + r [1 -F(y)j=C•ldy � � + r [1 -F(y)('dy =Yo>� 
i = 1  
Second, by Lemma 6, µ. > 0. Suppose that µ. has a limit �- Then � ;;;, 0. We will show that � =  0 
and � � I . Combining (14) with (15), we obtain x. 
= µ. r Q. (y)[l -F(y)Ylog2[I -F(y)]dy 
Let n � =, then 
= � r Qo(y)[l -F(y)("log2[I -F(y)]dy 
Since Q. (y) decreases with y by the assumption, then Q: (y) ,:; O for all y and n ,  and hence Q � (y) ,:; 0. 
If� > 0, then the above equation implies that liin � - I ,:; 0. That is, µ. ,:; x (n) when n is large n->- x(n) 
enough. Thus, when n � =, µ. � O since x. � 0. Therefore, � = 0 and hence lim � = 1. Thus, x(n) 
(14) implies that s'(Qo(y)) = y .  
Q.E.D. 
I: R&D 
P announces A 
a menu of invests 
contracts in R&D 
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II: PROCUREMENTS 
A A A 
observes chooses produces 
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FIGURE 1: The Timing of the two-stage Game 
i Prob ( new MC :>;y) 
- - - --�- r -
I 
x >0 
0 y y 








H(y Ix) I------_,,_:-------- y + h(y IX)
0 Q(y) 










1 .  The economic theory of procurement has much in common with the economic theory of 
regulation and auctioning. Because of asymmetric information, designing incentive 
procurement contracts is similar to regulatory mechanism design. Caillaud, Guesnerie, Rey, 
and Tirole (1988) review the recent literature on government regulation under asymmetric 
information. 
2. For a more complete survey of the recent literature on research, development, and diffusion, see 
Reinganum (1988). 
3. Research and development in defense procurements is characterized by a particularly high 
degree of uncertainty. First, the level of innovation is uncertain. Second, the government 
cannot easily verify the outcome of the innovation activity. Third, R&D decisions or efforts 
directed towards innovation by the firms are difficult for the government to observe directly. 
Because of these problems the government has difficulties in rewarding and encouraging 
innovation activity efficiently. But, one way to reward successful innovation is to create a prize 
which is related to the production of the item being procured. 
4. Laffont and Tirole (1988), and Fudenberg and Tirole (1988) have recently discussed the 
renegotiation issue in an agency model with moral hazard and in a repeated adverse selection 
model, respectively. Our model ofR&D and production includes both adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems. Because of this, the design of renegotiation-proof contracts is different 
from that in Fudenberg and Tirole (1988) and Laffont and Tirole (1988). The optimal 
production contract here should not only be renegotiation-proof, but also give the firm 
incentives to reveal its private information and to invest enough in R&D. Therefore, it is 
important to investigate commitment and renegotiation in procurement and contracting in a 
two-stage model with both adverse selection and moral hazard. 
5. It is often possible for the firm who wins the procurement contract to continue to exert some 
effort in order to reduce production cost further. If the production cost is ex post observable to 
the government, incentive contracts could be designed to give the chosen contractor an 
incentive to reduce production cost in both the R&D and production stage. In this case, 
incentive contracts can be based on both the R&D outcome and the realized production cost. 
Similar to Laffont and Tirole (1986), McAfee and McMillan (1987), It can be shown that a 
menu of linear contracts i.'1 both the expected cost and t.tie ex post observed cost is optimal in 
the case ofR&D and production uncertainty. But R&D changes the coefficients of the linear 
contracts. 
6. We can always rescale the variable x such that the R&D cost is linear in x .  
7. In the Appendix, we offer a proof that the Revelation Principal applies to our model. 
8. If the number of potential firms is endogenous, it can be shown that there exists a free entry 
equilibrium under which the equilibrium number of firms, the level of investment in R&D, and 
the break-even level of production cost are simultaneously determined. 
9. The innovation processes of different firms may not be the same, but usually have some 
common elements of technological uncertainty, one of which might be the general difficulty of 
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cost reduction. Because of these common factors the potential R&D outcomes among different 
firms may be correlated. It may then be possible for the govermnent to extract the full surplus 
from the contracting firms by designing appropriate incentive contracts. But this full extraction 
of surplus may discourage R&D. We do not discuss this issue here in detail. 
10. In general, production contracts could be allowed to depend on all bids (b1, • • . •  b.) or 
messages. However, we consider here a variable quantity auction in which the lowest bid firm 
wins the contract and the quantity depends on the lowest bid only. Without R&D, some 
regularity conditions are sufficient for this special contract to be optimal within general 
mechanisms (see Riordan and Sappington 1987). It remains an open question whether, with 
R&D, offering a contract [Q1 (b 1, . • •  , b. ),P1(b1, • • • •  b.)l to the ith firm improves the 
govermnent's expected welfare. 
1 1 .  We should be careful about this implication because some non-primitive conditions have been 
used in Proposition 9. Certainly, more research is needed to make this point clear. 
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